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Then you should say what you mean," the March Hare went on.
"I do," Alice hastily replied; "at least-at least I mean what I say-that's
the same thing, you kww. "I
Looking back on judicial decisions, we are nonplussed. An unexpected
opinion becomes explicable after it occurs. And, after it occurs, its significance
and meaning change. The opinion shakes expectations and reverberates within
its environment-becoming not an Augustinean absolute, but rather an
existential signpost to be observed, ignored or struck down. A decision from
the Supreme Court of Hawaii, Baehr v,. Lein,2 has similarly shaken equal and
fundamental rights jurisprudence,3 and it raises the specter of relativity in our
1 LEwIs CARROLL, AcE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERUAND 98 (MacMillan 1992) (lst
ed. 1866).
2 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993). The Baehr court included: two justices, one acting as chief justice; two judges
from the Intermediate Court of Appeals, replacing two recused justices; and a retired justice
appointed for a temporary term to fill a vacancy. Id. The opinion was written by Associate
Justice Levinson and was joined by Acting Chief Justice Moon. Id. Chief Judge Bums from
the Intermediate Court of Appeals concurred in the result. Id. at 68. Intermediate Court of
Appeals Judge Heen dissented. ld. at 70. Associate Justice Hayashi would have joined in the
dissent except that his temporary appointment expired before the filing of the opinion. Id. at
48.
3 1 use these terms together, as the distinction is not clear. What is a fundamental right?
Which groups deserve to be treated equally? What is equal? Which interests require
minimum equal standards, which require something more than minimum equal standards?
Which laws should be supported with a rational basis, which with a compelling interest?
I therefore cannot accept the majority's labored efforts to demonstrate that fundamental
interests, which call for strict scrutiny of the challenged classification, encompass only
established rights which we are somehow bound to recognize from the text of the
Constitution itself. To be sure, some interests which the Court has deemed to be
fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis are themselves constitutionally
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
language, system and beliefs.
The Baehr plurality holds: (1) sex-based distinctions are suspect for
purposes of equal protection analysis and are subject to the strict scrutiny test;
(2) the Hawaii marriage statute4 discriminates on the basis of sex; and (3) the
statute violates the Hawaii Constitution unless the state can justify it by proving
a compelling state interest.5 Although Baehr will probably legalize same-sex
marriage, it accepts earlier precedent holding that there is no fundamental right
to marriage and sidesteps the question of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Most importantly, Baehr implicitly adopts social constructionist6
tenets by redefining (or recognizing changing definitions of) sex-based
categories and marriage.
Gay activists will cheer Baehr for its end but not its means. In Bowers,
gays were denied their right to have sex, and in Baehr gay rights traded its
separate identity for a place in the gender/race-family. Some may wonder if
Baehr is a gay rights case at all; nevertheless, whatever the language, Baehr
changes the gay-legal landscape. First, by juxtaposing racial, gender, and
sexual orientation language Baehr re-humanizes judicial treatment of gays.
Second, Baehr opens a door around Bowers by recognizing a consanguinity
between gender and sexual orientation. Third, Baehr raises the possibility of a
fuller examination of sex-based equal rights, which recognizes subtle and
institutional sexism. Baehr is a monumental civil rights case-the first to fulfill
Brennan's prediction of expanding state constitutionally-based rights.7
fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis are themselves constitutionally
protected rights.
San Antonio Ind. Sch. Distr. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985).
5 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
6 Social constructionists believe that sexual orientation-and even gender-are concepts
created by society over time. No one is born gay. For example, societal forces make a
person gay, or societal forces make others perceive that person as gay. The concept of a
gay person is created by society. Social constructionism rejects the idea that there is a
natural law and that behavior is biologically fated (essentialism). For a good introduction to
social constructionism and essentialism, see EvE K. SEDGwICK, EPiSTEMOLOGY OF THE
CLOsEr 40-66 (1990); John Boswell, Revolutions, Universals, And Sexual Categories, in
HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: REcLMING TmE GAY & LESBIAN PAsT 17-36 (Martin B.
Duberman et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Duberman]; Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating
Controversy: Esentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L.
REV. 1833 (1993); Robert Padgug, Sexual Matters: Rethinking Sexuality in History, in
Duberman supra; David Gelman, Born or Bred?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at 46.
7 William I. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 (1977) ("Of late, however, more and more state courts are
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Throughout this Note, I discuss social constructionism in the law. In this
context, the law defines gay identity and is defined by it. Courts and gay legal
advocates respond to each other-changing the terminology and the discourse.
Part I introduces the issues and context in which Baehr was decided and will be
examined. Part II introduces socio-legal developments in the gay rights
movement as they relate to recognition of same-sex couples. Part H explicates
the Baehr decision. Part IV examines the resonance between sexual orientation
and gender equal and fundamental rights terminology. Part V introduces full
faith and credit and choice of law questions that Baehr will soon engender in
the courts.
I. CONTEXT
Hawaii is as likely a place as any to lead a redefinition and broadening of
our civil rights or-depending on your beliefs-weakening of our institutions
and Judeo-Christian values. Perhaps because Hawaii is not traditionally Judeo-
Christian,8 because the modem taboos against same-sex love are least rooted
there,9 and because Hawaii has the strongest protections against sexism,10
construing state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as
guaranteeing citizens of their states even more protection than the federal provisions, even
those identically phrased.")
8 Only 33% of the Hawaiian population is white. Japanese, Filipino, and Chinese
decendents comprise another 44% of the Hawaiian population. ALMANAC OF THE 50
STATES: BAsIC DATA PROFLES wrrH COMPARATVE TABLES 92 (Edith R. Hornor ed., 1994).
9 "Hawaii has a long tradition of tolerance for ethnic diversity and alternative lifestyles,
including homosexuality." Day One: Dearly Beloved-Gay Marriages Legal in Hawaii?
(ABC television broadcast, June 13, 1994). "Recent research shows that before missionaries
arrived here, homosexual relationships were accepted in Hawaii. Hawaiian kings and chiefs
openly took male lovers." Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Ties to Take a Stand Against Same Sex
Marriages, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at AS.
Sleeping here, sleeping there. That was an accepted custom of Hawaiian life
before the missionaries.
Relationships were defined by the people in them, not by outside institutions.
Some lasted a lifetime. Others faded as quickly as footprints erased by the
morning tides. And love between people of the same sex was as common as the
white sand beaches and coconut palms fluttering in the warm island breezes.
Immediately after they began arriving in 1820, the missionaries imposed their
view of life on the Hawaiians. All but heterosexual marriage became kapu-
forbidden-requiring all other romantic love to be hidden.
Deb Price, Hamaii Couple Try To Break Lock on Maniage, THE DErTorr NEWs, Dec. 11,
1992, available in LEXMS, NEWS Library, ARCNWS Fle.
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Hawaii has often been the first to assimilate "radical" ideas. For example,
Hawaii was the first state to legalize abortion,11 the first to approve the Equal
Rights Amendment, 12 and among the first to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 13
Hawaii has among the fewest social and legal barriers based on sex and
sexual orientation, and now with Baehr, Hawaii has become the first state to
require that the remaining legal barriers be justified by compelling state
interests. 14 And while public opinion polls and legislative activity suggest that a
majority of Hawaiians oppose the Baehr decision, 15 significant groups have
acquiesced to or supported it.' 6 Even those groups opposed to the decision
seem ready to compromise with an offer that leapfrogs any official recognition
of same-sex couples yet seen in this country.' 7 If on remand and successive
10 See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (1978): "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the
laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in
the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry." (emphasis added).
11 Essoyan, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 See id.; HAW. RLv. STAT. §§ 368-1, 489-1 to -8 (Supp. 1992). In 1983 Wisconsin
passed the first such law. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.31 (West 1988).
14Aithough this statement may be overly broad, the Baehr plurality has dramatically
broadened the scope of the equal rights provision of the Hawaii Constitution. Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 44 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw.
1993).
15 58% percent of Hawaiians say they oppose same-sex marriages. Essoyan, supra
note 9; 61% of Hawaiians say they oppose legalization of same-sex marriages. ADvoc.,
July 27, 1993, at 18.
"The possible legalization of gay marriage by Hawaii's courts has produced more than
just outrage. There's an organized political effort to stop it." Day One, supra note 9.
16 The Japanese-American Council voted to support the legalization of same-sex
marriages. Steven A. Chin, Vote for Gay Maniage Followed Uphill Fight; Issue Divides
Japanese American affzens League, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 10, 1994, at A4. "'[A] threat to
the civil rights of one American is a threat to the civil rights of all Americans.'" Id. (quoting
Rep. Norman Mineta, JACL member).
"'If you look at the historical arguments why black and white shouldn't mix or yellow
and purple or whatever, it was because it was immoral. And that's the same kind of
argument and hysteria that's being debated with regards to same-sex marriage.'" Deb Price,
Same-Sex Mariage Gets New Voice, Cmc. SUN-TwMES, Sept. 30, 1994, at 39 (editorial
quoting Bill Kaneko, the immediate past Vice President of the national JACL). Japanese
Americans make up 22% percent of the Hawaii population. Id.
171 am referring to domestic partnership and to adult adoption. As the saying goes,
what's old is new again. Professor Boswell suggests that adult adoption was practiced during
the Roman Empire.
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appeal this decision becomes something other than it now is, it will still be a
"wedding bell heard around the world." 18
Other states, courts and legislatures will have to grapple with Baehr,19 or
with Baehr's acceptance of relative and fluid definitions of gender and sexual
orientation in much the same way as other courts have previously adapted to
relative and fluid definitions of sexual orientation and sexual acts.20 As gay
activists have differed in their willingness to disassociate sexual orientation and
sexual acts,21 they are likely to be equally unharmonious in their reaction to
Baehr's association of gender and sexual orientation and implicit disassociation
of same-sex marriages and sexual orientation. In addition, Baehr increases the
A third type of formal same-sex union involved the legal practice of "collateral
adoption": one man adopted another as his brother.
Under the early empire men began to adopt as brothers (rather than as sons)
persons who thus became heirs but not children.
JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEx UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 97 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
18 "[Baehr may be] the most far-reaching civil rights case since the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned laws against interracial marriage in 1967." Michael Gray, Hawaii Could
Be the First State to OK Same-Sex Marriage, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 20, 1994, at A22.
19 If Baehr stands, other states will inevitably have to decide whether to recognize a
Hawaii same-sex marriage. This full faith and credit problem will be introduced in infra
part IV.
20 See, e.g., Watdins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.), modified, 847
F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
In this opinion we use the term "sexual orientation" to refer to the orientation of an
individual's sexual preference, not to his actual sexual conduct. Individuals whose
sexual orientation creates in them a desire for sexual relationships with persons of the
opposite sex have a heterosexual orientation. Individuals whose sexual orientation
creates in them a desire for sexual relationships with persons of the same sex have a
homosexual orientation.
In contrast, we use the terms "homosexual conduct" and "homosexual acts" to
refer to sexual activity between two members of the same sex whether their orientations
are homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual ....
Id. at 1429 n.1.
21 "'It is incredibly harmful to argue that there is a valid distinction between status and
conduct. If I can be a lesbian but am not allowed to ever sleep with women, I'm not
interested in being a lesbian. Even when we win these cases by making the status-conduct
distinction, we win the battle but lose the war.'" Chris Bull, Ozoosing Up Sides, ADVOC.,
July 12, 1994, at 29 (quoting Chai Feldblum, an openly lesbian law professor at
Georgetown University).
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legal ties between feminism and gay rights;22 an interplay that finds its origin
in the development of a group identifiable by its sexual acts and (more recently)
orientation.23 Commonality in the feminist and gay rights movement has been
recognized by feminist scholars for some time.24
There is nothing determinative in the Constitution or the opinions of the
U.S. Supreme Court as to the reach of the Baehr decision.25 The Full Faith
22By deciding Baehr on gender grounds, the plurality may have eliminated the
separate, legal identity of gay people and gay rights. See infra part I. Professor Steven
Epstein argues that gay identity is based on the ability to organize around the category of
"gayness." "How do you protest a socially imposed categorization, except by organizing
around the category? Just as blacks cannot fight the arbitariness of racial classification
without organizing as blacks, so gays could not advocate the overthrow of the sexual order
without making their gayness the very basis of their claims." Steven Epstein, Gay Politics,
Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Sodal Constrmc'onisrn, SOCIALIST REv. May-Aug. 1987, at
9, 19. For a discussion of the creation of sexual categories, see Ed Cohen, Who Are "We"?
Gay "Identity" as Political (E)motion (A Theoretical Runination), in INsIDE/OuT: LESBIAN
THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 81-82 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
23 See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKN, INTERCOURSE (1987); CATHARINE MACKiNNoN,
FEMm UNmoDImD: DiscouRsES oN LrE AND LAw 27 (1987); SUZANNE PHARR,
HOMOPHOBIA: A WEAPON OF SEXISM (1988).
Patriarchy-an enforced belief in male dominance and control-is the ideology and
sexism the system that holds it in place. The catechism goes like this: Who do gender
roles serve? Men and the women who seek power from them. Who suffers from
gender roles? Women most completely and men in part. How are gender roles
maintained? By the weapons of sexism: economics, violence, homophobia.
Id at 8.
24 PHARR, supra note 23, at 8; Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Epe?1ence, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 227, 227-54 (Henry
Abelove et al. eds., 1993). Contra SEDGwIcK, supra note 6.
The Study of sexuality is not coexstensive with the study of gender; correspondingly,
antihomophobic inquiry is not coextensive with the study of gender, correspondingly,
antihomophobic inquiry is not cocxstenive with feminist inquiry. But we can't know in
advance how they will be different.
Id at 27.
25 The Supreme Court has examined the validity of legal "status" in a state other than
the forum state. For a clear analysis see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (full
faith and credit does not compel one state to substitute statutes of other states for its own
statutes dealing with subject matter with which it is competent to legislate); Fauntleroy v.
Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (forcing a Mississippi court to enforce a Missouri judgment
recognizing the validity of a contract that was illegal under Mississippi law).
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and Credit Clause will not necessarily require other states to recognize Baehr.
Instead, courts will taste it over and over, each time seasoned by new facts
relating to the interests of the foreign state(s), the property or rights at stake,
and the policies in balance.26 Some states will spit out the Baehr decision,
Family law questions-foreign divorce decrees, constructive divorce decrees, marriage
licenses, and marital property-have also faced full faith and credit scrutiny in the Supreme
Court. In each of these cases, the Court seems to balance the forum state's public policy
interests against the interest in comity. The Court's analysis, however, fails to create a
determinative framework. See, e.g., infra part IV; Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l
Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965) (constructive divorce decree extinguished wife's right to intestate
succession); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 378 U.S. 540 (1964) (invalid Florida divorce decree had to
be given full faith and credit in West Virginia: the judgment could not be challenged);
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (constructive divorce decree in Nevada did
not extinguish wife's rights under New York law); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568
(1956) (Ohio court allowed to adjudicate wife's right to alimony even though there was a
valid constructive divorce decree in Florida); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202
(1933) (Georgia consent decree fixing child support payments held res judicata and entitled
to full faith and credit in South Carolina); United States v. Snyder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C. 1949)
(holding that a bigamous marriage created by the invalidity of a prior Mexican divorce is.an
exception to the rule that a marriage which is valid where it was performed is valid
everywhere).
The Court has also failed to create a determinative full faith and credit framework for
workers' compensation claims and personal injury actions. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955) (m a personal injury case, the forum state's interest is so strong that the forum
state need not grant full faith and credit to the home state); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951) (Wisconsin statute refusing to recognize other states' wrongful death right of action
violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Industrial Comm'n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622
(1947) (full faith and credit should not bind a forum state to recognize a home state's
exclusive remedy for employment-related injury provision); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (forum state has interest in awarding
compensation to an injured worker that allows it to apply its law instead of the law of the
home state); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935)
(home state is allowed to apply its own personal injury laws in a case where the nonresident
alien was injured outside of the state but signed the employment contract in the state).
26 For an introduction to full faith and credit see Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments
and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the
Interstate Contet, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1984); Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional
Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Comnon Law: A General Approach, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986); Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, False Conflicts and Interstate
Preclustion. Moing Beyond a Wooden Reading of the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 593 (1990); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's
MIause ofthe Constituion, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1945); Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A.
Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 153 (1949);
William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Linda A. Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full
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finding it obnoxious to its public policy;27 some may swallow it whole, as the
"better law"; 28 most will nibble at it bit by bit.29 Each case will present a
decision potentially reviewable by the Supreme Court.
In this process, the relativity of the terms "sexual orientation," "gender,"
and "sexual acts" will infuse and destabilize the status of marriage and further
disassociate concepts and principles in our ever-fluid equal and fundamental
rights laws. In considering one issue-in the context of full faith and credit3 -
our courts will return again and again to the initial question of definitions,
changing them by their very reliance upon them.
II. SAME-SEX CouPLES: NEW CONCEPT OR NEW DISTASTE
The late Professor John Boswell examined the history of gay relationships
throughout his career.31 In his most recent work, 32 he argued that the Catholic
Church has had a long history of recognizing same-sex unions.33 The study is
not as much an argument that same-sex couples have existed throughout time as
it is an argument that modem fear and distaste are not solely products of the
church. 34 Similarly, Professor Eskridge recently examined same-sex couples
Faith and Cre&t: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1967);
Ralph U. Whitten, The Constional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and
Oedit, 12 MEM. ST. L. REV. 1 (1981); Ronald A. Hecker, Note, Full Faith and Credit to
Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CAL. L. REV. 282 (1966).
2 7 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws indicates that polygamous marriages,
certain incestuous marriages, or the marriage of minors below a certain age may be
sufficiently contrary to a strong public policy of a state as to require invalidation by the
forum state. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICt OFLAws § 283 (1969).
28 See Leflar, infra note 163 and accompanying text.
29 1 argue that the courts will probably go through an evolutionary process in
recognizing same-sex marriages. First, same-sex marriages will be recognized only in
certain circumstances and without the currently recognized marital rights. Over time, the
circumstances in which the marriage is validated will broaden. Some of the rights of
marriage may then be give to same-sex marriages, but not the status. See, e.g., In re Dalip
Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (allowing the two wives of a foreign
sheik to recover the proceeds of a California bank account through interstate succession).
3 0 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
31 Boswell's work includes: JOHN E. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANrrY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE,
AND HOMOsExuALrrY: GAY PEOPLE IN WEsTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE
CmuSTAN ERA TO THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980) [hereinafter SOCIAL]; JOHN E.
BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994) [hereinafter UNIONS].
3 2 BOSWELL, UNIONS, supra note 31.33 Id. at 281.
34 "Much of the present volume, on the other hand, is specifically intended to rebut the
common idea that religious belief-Christian or other-has been the cause of intolerance in
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throughout Western and particularly non-Western history. 35 He rejects
contemporary arguments that suggest there is no basis for recognizing same-sex
marriages because same-sex marriage is an oxymoron. In fact, scholars seem to
have moved past a search for same-sex relationships in history to an
examination of the identification and separateness of these relationships in the
broader society.
36
Many people are familiar with male same-sex relationships common in
classical Greece. 37 These transgenerational couplings of a citizen (or, outside of
Greece, an aristocratic elder) and a boy existed throughout the classical world
in similar forms-in the Aegean Islands, Egypt, Japan, and China.38 Some
historians suggest these relationships were similar to different-sex relationships
of the period(s) in that the elder male would court a boy and seek permission
from the boy's family. In each of these cultures, same-sex coupling primarily
occurred among elite males. Moreover, roles in these relationships were static
and reflective of broader class and gender roles. Men did not take on
regard to gay people." BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 6.
35 William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Hisory of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419
(1993).
36 See generally GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE,
AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD 1890-1940 (1994); LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD
GIRLS AND TwIIr LOvERS: A HISTORY OF LESBLAN LiFE IN TwENTITH-CENTURY
AMERICA 42-43 (1991); JONATHAN N. KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS & GAY
MEN IN THE U.S.A. (Meridian 1992); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 187.
37 See, e.g., David Halperin, Sex Before Se xalty: Pederasty, Politics, and Power in
Gass'cal Athens, in Duberman, supra note 6, at 37.
38 Eskridge, supra note 35; Paul G. Schalow, Male Love in Early Modern Japan.: A
Literary Depiction of the "Youth," in Duberman, supra note 6, at 118; Vivien W. Ng,
Homosexuality and the State in Late hnperial Odna, in Duberman, supra note 6, at 76.
Note that Boswell argues that the same-sex relationships in classical Rome were
companionate. See BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 61-87.
Although it is impossible to label all of the same-sex activity in these cultures neatly,
the following summary provides a useful framework.
[Homosexual relations ... are likely to be organized in one of three broad
patterns: (1) between adults and youths...; (2) between persons who abide by their
culture's gender conventions (i.e. "feminine" women and "masculine" men) and
persons who assume the cultural status of the other sex or of an "intermediate" gender;
and (3) between persons of equal age and status (as is conventional in our own society).
Considerable evidence also exists of homosexual relations between men whose status is
differentiated as superordinate and subordinate on the basis of class or race.
George Chauncey, Jr. et al., Introduction, in Duberman, supra note 6, at 9.
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companionate same-sex relationships but, rather, transgenerational relationships
in which the adult, male role was dominant. "In Classical Athens," writes
Professor Halperin, "sexual partners came in two different kinds-not male and
female but active and passive, dominant and submissive." 39
Only in less rigid societies40 where distinctions between males and females
were more often based, at least in part, on ability and inclination rather than
status is there consistent evidence of companionate relationships and consistent
accounts of female same-sex couplings. 41 Where this did occur, the gender
lines were blurred. In some Native American cultures, for example, men who
dressed and had the sensibilities of women-Berdache-were revered as being
closer to the spirit. 4 2 Some families raised their boys to be a Berdache.
Similarly, there are examples of women huntresses with a wife or wives at
home.43
Where there were essentially classless and non-sexist societies (or at least
less sexist and less classist societies) men and women formed relationships as
ostensible equals. Though same-sex coupling was prevalent in Classical
societies, it molded to class and gender roles in which a white male ruled
society and the bed.44 Where there is no evidence of same-sex companionate
relationships, they may have been hidden not because sodomy was forbidden,
but because same-sex sexual acts and relationships between two equal men
would necessarily place one of those men in the role of a wife, boy, slave,
3 9 Halperin, supra note 37, at 50.
40 For example, these less rigid societies include: Native American Nations,
premodem African nations, and premodern South American Nations. It should be noted that
there is some evidence of companionate same-sex male relationships among warriors and
knights primarily in the middle ages. Professor Boswell also includes Classical Rome in this
category, stating that there was an "almost limitless tolerance of Roman mores...
BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 91.
41 Other examples can be found, but they generally do not suggest the same kind of
formal coupling. Professor Chauncey argues that the history of male same-sex coupling
differs from female same-sex coupling: "The differences between men's and women's
power and the qualities ascribed to them in a male-dominated culture were so significant
that the social and spatial organization of gay and lesbian life inevitably took very different
forms." CHAUNCEY, supra note 37, at 27.
4 2 KATz, supra note 36, at 285-318.
43 Even in the literature describing these societies, I find no reference to different-sex
couples in which a woman took a dominant role. Of course female-dominated heterosexual
relationships may have existed even if they have not found their way into the anthropologic
and sociologic studies.
44 Contra BOSWELL, UNIONS, supra note 31, at 58-68 (discussing Plato's Symposiwn
and heroic military couples).
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servant, or eunuch. 45
It is hard to say when those with same-sex desire began disassociating with
the rest of society, or even when they began the process of self-identification. 46
Generally, there was nothing about committing same-sex acts that made one
different, nor was there any possibility of a culture composed from these
participants. 47 Still, persecution of those who committed same-sex acts
occurred throughout Western history. 48 And despite Boswell's contrary
argument, 49 persecution seems to have surrounded the development of
Christianity and-in particular-its rejection of sex for any purpose except
propagation. 50
At the same time, however, sexual desire for the same sex or for the
different sex, at least for privileged males, was a spectrum and not a chasm.
Whether this resulted from an availability of free time and sufficiency of
4 5 See David A.L Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Gassification:
An Alenative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55
OHIo ST. LJ. 491, 516-20 (1994). See also BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 122.
In early law the popular prejudice against an adult male citizen's passivity in
sexual relations does not seem to have found official expression, but by the third
century it had become a form of stuprwn. The jurist Paulus opined in his Sententiae
(2.27.12), collected around 300, that a male who voluntarily underwent stuprwn (i.e.,
was passive to another male) should lose half his estate.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46 See generally Stephen Hedge, The Problematics of Identity (Dec. 9, 1992)
(unpublished essay on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (summarizing the related
literature).
47 
"It would be similarly nonsensical to call a figure from the past a homosexual when
no such category existed. Many people . . . continue to invest in this fantasy of the
homosexual as a separate category of persons defined by a stable sexuality." John
Champagne, letter to the editor, ADVoC., Jan. 12, 1993, at 12.
48 See generally BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31. I suggest only that Boswell
overstates the case for Christian tolerance.
49 "This [Christi.anity]... is clearly a justification rather than a cause of prejudice."
BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 12.
5 0 Recently, Pope John Paul II reiterated the Catholic church's opposition to gay
rights. "Including 'homosexual orientation' among the considerations on the basis of which
it is illegal to discriminate can easily lead to regarding homosexuality as a positive source of
human rights . . . This is all the more mistaken since there is no right to
homosexuality.. .'" Catherine Treasure, GAY TIME, Oct., 1992, at 24 (quoting an informal
document made public from the Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, the body
responsible for defining Roman Catholic Doctrine).
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necessities, or of weaker moral values among elites, 51 prevalence of same-sex
activity among elites probably ignited hostility and fear of those with same-sex
desire. Further, the asocial tag that followed this desire for so much of recent
history also followed periods of destabilizing urbanization and less directly-
anti-Semitism. It is quite possible that it is another example of "have-nots"
being suspicious of "haves"52 and/or scapegoating the "other" for deficiencies
in resources and failure of expectations.5 3
The actual identity of homosexuals as a group came recently, for the
recognition of companionate same-sex acts itself is a modem phenomenon.5 4
51 The most recent scholarship rejects these conclusions. Gay subculture has been
perceived as middle class or elite, however, this may only be because historians have
looked to elite primary sources. For example, Professor Chauncey writes:
But the most visible gay world of the early twentieth century, as the headlines in the
Balinore Afro-American suggest, was a working-class world, centered in African-
American and Irish and Italian immigrant neighborhoods and along the city's busy
waterfront, and drawing on the social forms of working-class culture.
CHAUNCEY, supra note 36, at 10.
52 The persecution of gays is similar to the persecution of Jews. Professor Boswell
writes: .
Mhe fate of Jews and gay people has been almost identical throughout European
history, from early Christian hostility to extermination in concentration camps. The
same laws which oppressed Jews oppressed gay people; the same groups bent on
eliminating Jews tried to wipe out homosexuality; the same periods of European history
which could not make room for Jewish distinctiveness reacted violently against sexual
nonconformity; the same countries which insisted on religious uniformity imposed
majority standards of sexual conduct; and even the same methods of propaganda were
used against Jews and gay people-picturing them as animals bent on the destruction of
the children of the majority.
BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
See also Erwin 1. Haeberle, Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The Destruction
of Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in Duberman, supra note
6, at 365 (arguing that persecution was directed against intellectual and cultural freedom).
53 Boswell argues that it was ruralization-at least from the Roman era to the middle
ages-and the increasing absolutism of Roman government that brought with them social
intolerance. BOSWELL, SOCIAL, supra note 31, at 121-36. Boswell also acknowledges that
the rise in intolerance in the late middle ages accompanied a period of continuing
urbanization. Id. at 270. What does seem to be accepted by all scholars is the notion that
urbanization brought with it the development of gay subcultures including gay arts. Id. at
334.
54 See infra part III.
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Thus, one could not speak of a gay rights movement until very recently.55 And
even then, it was more aptly described as a movement for sexual liberation.56
Equality based on a class of homosexuals is only a contemporary idea. So it is
not surprising that the terms are in such flux. Nor is it surprising-in light of
the history-that some feminists see in the gay rights movement an opportunity
to break down society's sex roles, and thereby fight sexism in marriage and
other institutions. 57
At first, the gay rights agenda's focus on broadening and liberating sex and
sexual desire promised to free women from the lose-lose paradigm of frigid or
floozy. If men could assimilate some men's desire for other men, then a
woman's desire either for a man or a woman would be less of a threat. Gay
rights, many feminists thought, could bring an end to sexual power roles.58
55 Many people suppose that "Stonewall" was the beginning of the gay rights
movement, however, Chauncey and Boswell argue that the roots are much deeper. See
BOSWELL, SOciAL, supra note 31; BOSWELL, UNIONS, supra note 31; CHAUNCEY, supra
note 36; Patricia A. Cain, Liigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA.
L. REv. 1551 (1993). All three authors reject linear views of gay history in favor of
episodic and cyclical notions. There have been many periods of tolerance and many periods
of intolerance. Stonewall just marked the end-arguably-of the most recent period of
intolerance.
Contra JOHN D'E Iio, SEXUAL POLiriCS, SExuAL COMMUN~rms: THE MAKING OF A
HOMOSEXUAL MINORrrY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-1970 (1983) (arguing that gay
awareness and identity developed in the United States because of World War II, gay bars,
the Kinsey Study, and Stonewall); KATZ, supra note 36, at 1 ("We have been the silent
minority, the silenced minority-invisible women, invisible men.").
Still, Stonewall serves as a valid marker in the development of a modem American gay
rights movement. C Law, supra note 36.
56 "'If the first wave of gay liberation was merely about unleashing sexual energy, the
second wave is about marriage and family. We are entering the second wave.'" Chris Bull,
Tl Death Do Us Part, ADVOC., Nov. 30, 1993, at 41, 42 (quoting Andrew Sullivan,
Editor, THE NEW REPUBLIC).
Professor Rivera argues that the first wave was an anti-assimilationist movement:
"They did not fight back for the right to assimilate, to be like everyone else; rather, they
fought back because they were visibly 'different' and were tired of being treated as less than
human." Rhonda R. Rivera, Where Are We? Anti-Gay-Lesbian-Bisexual Ballot Attacks
Today, 55 Omo ST. L. 555, 557 (1994).
57 "Heterosexism and homophobia work together to enforce compulsory
heterosexuality and that bastion of patriarchal power, the nuclear family." PHARR, supra
note 23, at 16-17.
Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin focus much of their work on the sexism
and violence in heterosexual relationships. E.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1988);
CATHARINEMACKNNON, FEMINISM UNMODFIED (1987).
5 8 To be a lesbian is to be perceived as someone who has stepped out of line, who has
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Having neither succeeded nor failed in the earliest goals, feminists recently
adjudged in the gay rights movement a potential to break down the static and
sexist definitions of marriage and family. 59 Although neither of these
movements have seen unanimous support among the affected communities, this
later development has been especially contentious. 60 Some feminists are afraid
the gay rights movement threatens women's status. For example, is a gay-
rights push for equal recognition of same-sex couples an assimilation into
"straight patriarchy"?6 1 Further, the gay rights movement has continually
moved out of sexual/economic dependence on a male, who is woman-identified....
A lesbian is perceived as a threat to the nuclear family, to male dominance and control,
to the very heart of sexism.
PHARR, supra note 23, at 18.
Misogyny gets transferred to gay men with a vengeance and is increased by the fear that
their sexual identity and behavior will bring down the entire system of male dominance and
compulsory heterosexuality.
Id. at 19.
5 9 Kathleen Gough argues that the family-as we now understand it-is the propagator
of patriarchy.
[Family allows men] to deny women sexuality or to force it upon them; to command or
exploit their labor to control their produce; to control or rob them of their children; to
confine them physically and prevent their movement; to use them as objects in male
transactions; to cramp their creativeness; or to withhold from them large areas of the
society's knowledge and cultural attainments.
Rich, supra note 24, at 232 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kathleen Gough). See also Claudia
A. Lewis, From This Day Forward:i A Feminine Moral Discourse on Homosexual Marriage,
97 YALE LJ. 1783 (1988).
Of course, not everyone agrees on an assimilationist approach. See, e.g., Steven K.
Homer, Note, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1993).
60 [N]ot all gays and lesbians agree that it is wise to seek official recognition for same-
sex families through mainstream institutions such as marriage. Replicating such
institutions, they fear will reproduce the sexism and complacency they say is inherent in
them.
Bull, supra note 21, at 43.
61 Although most activists that are opposed to same-sex marriage because of the
patriarchal roots of marriage support partnership laws and partnership benefits, classism has
been a dominant feature of the partnership movement thus far. See, e.g., John Gallagher,
Benefits for the Fringe, ADvoc., Jan. 25, 1994, at 56.
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struggled with its own sexism and racial prejudice 62 and its history as a
counter-cultural movement is far-eclipsed by its history as a privilege of the
elite.63 If recognition of same-sex coupling throughout history makes gay
family recognition more palatable, it could similarly make it less radical and
less beneficial to the feminist movement directly and to other civil rights
movements more indirectly. 64 Still, as Baehr suggests, recognition of
companionate same-sex couples would effect a redefinition of marriage and
family65 and a radical change from our modem social norms toward those of
less rigid societies.
III. FROM Bown.s TO BAER
"Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to leave the court."
Everybody looked at Alice.
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice.
"You are," said the King.
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen.
"Well, I shan't go, at any rate," said Alice; "besides, that's not a regular
rule: you invented itjust now."
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King.
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice.
The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily.66
The fortuity surrounding Baehr parallels the lack of fortuity surrounding
Bowers.67 Justice Blackmun's files, recently made public, tell us that the vote
to grant certiorari prevailed only because Justice Powell expressed an indication
that he might overturn the sodomy law. In fact, Powell ended up voting with
62 See generally John Gallagher, Troubled Alliance, ADvoc., Oct. 5, 1993, at 37, 40.
"IThe gay rights movement has failed to make... strides in reversing its own racism .... Mhe
gay and lesbian movement has been wholly ineffectual in dealing with racism and in building
coalitions with other progressive communities." Id. (quoting Nadine Smith).
63 See, e.g., James Steakley, Iconography of a Scandal; Political Cartoons and the
Eulenburg Affair in Wilhelmin Gerrmay, in Duberman, supra note 36, at 233. Contra
CHAUNCEY, supra note 36 (arguing that in recent American history, homosexual subculture
was most pronounced in the working class).
64 The same has been said on behalf of focusing the movement on domestic
partnership and not marriage in order to create new familial institutions free from our
historical constructs.
65 The definition of family is being challenged in the law and culture. See, e.g.,
NANCY ANDREws, FAMILY: A PoRTRAIrr OF GAY AND LESBIAN AMERICA (1994) (a
photojournalistic study).
66 CARROLL, supra note 1, at 180.
67 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the majority in deciding that there is no fundamental right for homosexuals to
engage in sodomy. 6s This decision, he later indicated, was the biggest mistake
of his tenure on the court.69 Justice Powell did not think it a mistake to decide
that there is no fundamental right to engage in same-sex sodomy, but, he
thought, it was a mistake to frame the issue in such terms. Almost any broader
language would have either compelled a different decision or a more "straight-
forward" 70 curtailment of the fundamental rights jurisprudence.71
A. Bowers v. Hardwick- Creating a Legalized Minority
Because there are many excellent analyses of this opinion elsewhere, 72 I
will limit its discussion here; however, it should be noted that the significance
of Bowers is often overlooked. 73 In terms of constitutional law, Bowers
curtailed the expansion of fundamental rights and, by limiting substantive due
process, opened the door for the Court's restrictions of those rights already
68 Id. at 187.
69 "'I think I probably made a mistake on that one.'" Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets
Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. PosT, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3 (quoting retired Supreme Court
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.).
70 This is an allusion to Professor Rivera's article, Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-
Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HAsTINGS
L.L 799 (1979) (arguing that homophobia is imbedded in our judicial system).
71 It is interesting to note that the Court used a variant of substantive due process
analysis to limit its late twentieth century foray into substantive due process, and
fundamental rights. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
72 See, e.g., Mitchell L. Pearl, Note, Making the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63
N.Y.U. L. REv. 154 (1988); Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Deterninants ofBowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073
(1988); Thomas Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick. Precedent by Personal Prediliction, 54 U.
CL. L. REV. 648 (1987); Yvonne L. Tharpes, Comment, Bowers v. Hardwick and the
Legitimization of Homophobia in America, 30 How. L.J. 829.
73 Rhonda Rivera, (forthcoming) (on teaching Bowers v. Hardwick).
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outlined. 74 In terms of "gaylaw," 75 Bowers is a roadblock at every turn.
Bowers justifies, in part, the ban on gays in the military, 76 the denial of
custodial awards to gay parents, 77 the refusal to recognize same-sex couples (in
terms of domestic partnership laws, same-sex marriage,78 and immigration
rights), 79 and, perhaps most importantly, the legality of limitations on the right
of gays to participate in the political process.80 The potential for homosexuals
74 Grirswd . . . applied the right of privacy in sexual matters to the marital
relationship. Eisenstadt... however, clearly demonstrates that the right to privacy in
sexual relationships is not limited to the marital relationship. Both Roe . . . and
Eisensta& ... cogently demonstrate that intimate personal decisions or private matters
of substantial importance to the well-being of the individuals involved are protected by
the Due Process Clause. The right to select consenting adult sexual partners must be
considered within this category. The exercise of that right, whether heterosexual or
homosexual, should not be proscribed by state regulation absent compelling
justification.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (E.D. Va. 1975) (Merhige, I.,
dissenting), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). Judge Merhige argues that Doe should have
followed in the reasoning of the privacy line of cases. Id. at 1203-05. By rejecting the
privacy cases as controlling in Doe, and later in Bowers, the Court signaled not only its
retreat from gay rights, but also its retreat from privacy as a fundamental right. The Court's
subsequent decisions reaffirm this view. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
402 U.S. 490 (1989); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
75 1 use this term to refer to the spectrum of legal disciplines encompassed by such
comprehensive articles as: Developments in the Law.- Sexual Ofientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989); Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developtents in Sexual Preference
Law, 30 DRAxE L. REV. 311 (1980-81); Rhonda R. Rivera, QueerLaw: Sexual Orientation
Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part 1, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 459 (1985); Rhonda R. Rivera,
Queer Law: Sexual Orientation Law in the Mid-Eighties, Part 17, 11 U. DAYTON L. REV.
275 (1986).
76 Many of the legal battles have hinged on the Pentagon's claim that a homosexual
orientation is indistinguishable from illegal sexual conduct and as such is a threat to military
discipline and morale. Bull, supra note 21, at 29-30.
77 Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting). "It appears that homosexuals, such as Lisa Chicoine, are committing felonies,
by their acts against nature and God." Id.
78 Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
79 Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111
(1982) (although the court does not cite Bowers, the legitimacy of constitutionally excluding
homosexuals stands as a back-drop against which this decision was made).
80 Professor Coles quotes from the brief of the defenders of Colorado Amendment
Two, which outlaws non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. "The Supreme
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to engage in the illegal act-sodomy81-is a justification for preclusion from
state employment82 and sanction of discrimination.83 There are, of course, a
host of cultural obstacles that flow from these legal ones.84 Further, Bowers
has forced "gaylaw" and the courts which have had to deal with it to
disassociate sex-acts (sodomy) from sexual orientation and the group(s) defined
by sexual orientation.85
In addition, Bowers has created a legal minority, defined by its propensity
to do an illegal act. Without Bowers, much of the institutional discrimination
Court said in Bowers, at the very end of the opinion, that a majority of the Georgia
electorate disapproving of gay people is a proper purpose. Therefore, we can invoke that
purpose on the basis of Bowers despite your rule against improper purposes." Matthew
Coles, Equal Protection and the Anti-avil- Rights Initiatives: Protecting the Ability of
Lesbians and Gay Men to Bargain in the Pluralist Bazaar, 55 OHIo ST. L.. 563, 570
(1994).
81 Sodomy remains criminalized in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. ALA.
CODE § 13A6-65(a)(3) (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411, 1412 (1989); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-122(b) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1992); GA.
COE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3305 (1988); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14.89 (West 1986); MD. CODE ANN., Crim.
LAW §§ 553-554 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-29-59 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-505 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.190
(1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 886 (West 1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (West 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1992).
82 Georgia's Attorney General, Michael Bowers, recently withdrew an offer of
employment given an Emory University Law School student when he found out that she
was marrying a woman. Bowers v. Shahar, 836 F. Supp 859, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
Bowers argued that hiring Shahar would harm the image of his office as it enforces
Georgia's sodomy statute. Id. at 864 n.4.
83 See, e.g., Childers v. Dallas Police Dept., 513 F. Supp. 134, 147 (N.D. Tex.
1981), af#'d, 669 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1982).
84 LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE LAw (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
To lesbians and gay men, this means, as Larry Kramer has written, "We are denied the
right to love. Can you imagine being denied the right to love?" Worse still, the U.S.
Supreme Court has condoned this oppression, ruling in the Hardwick case that our love
for one another has no place in American constitutional jurisprudence.
Id. at xvii.
85 To avoid Bowers, advocates argue that being gay does not necessarily mean that
someone will commit sodomy. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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that has plagued other minorities might not have existed for homosexuals. As
Professor Boswell wrote: "Majorities, in other words, create minorities, in one
very real sense, by deciding to categorize them."
86
B. Baehr.* Engendering Gay Rights
National gay activist-attorneys have worried about where and when to
bring suits ever since Bowers.87 Many perceive the Bowers fiasco as a failure
of timing.88 It was not surprising then, that when Nina Baehr and Genora
Dancel, Tammy Rodriguez and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph
Melilio filed suit against the state for refusing to grant them marriage licenses,
they were ostracized. Other marriage challenges had been lost89 and no one
wanted more damaging precedent. Here, however, fortuity brought them a
young court;9° and, as hindsight tells us, a social climate suited to such a
cultural and normative challenge. 91
Although only alluded to in the Baehr plaintiffs' brief,92 the gender
discrimination claim became the basis of the court's decision. The plurality's
86 BOSWELL, SOCiAL, supra note 31, at 59. Discrimination against those with same-sex
sexual desire, however, long precedes Bowers.
87 See, e.g.,Bull, supra note 56, at46.
88 Conlra Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by the Law in the 1990s
USA- The Condimdng Toll of Bowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE LAW REV. 1, 7
(1994).
89 See, e.g., McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1046 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal divmirsed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63
(Haw.) (responding to Jones), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993).
Mhe Virginia courts declared that interracial marriage simply could not exist because
the Deity had deemed such a union intrinsically unnatural, and, in effect, because it had
theretofore never been the "custom" of the state to recognize mixed marriages,
marriage "always" having been construed to presuppose a different configuration. With
all due respect to the Virginia courts of a bygone era, we don't believe that trial judges
are the ultimate authorities on the subject of Divine Will, and, as Loving amply
demonstrates, constitutional law may mandate, like it or not, that customs change with
an evolving social order.
I (citations omitted).
90 Robin Clark, Hawaii Under Cowlt Order to Deal With Gay Maniages, PHOENIX
GAzETTE, Sept. 23, 1994, at A31.
91 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
92 Plaintiffs' Brief at 9 n.2, Baehr (No. 91-1394-05).
1995] 1003
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
argument that if under the marriage law,93 a woman can not marry a woman
and a man cannot marry a man, then the law discriminates on its face on the
basis of gender, has been called disingenuous. 94 In fact, it can be read two
ways: either the court put the cart before the horse in much the same way the
Bowers court did-choosing an outcome and then justifying it95 -or it chose to
see marital definitions as a gender issue in a manner similar to the Supreme
Court's analysis of presumptions that men are the primary "breadwinners" in
Frontiero v. Richardson.96 Unlike in Frontiero, the Baehr court applied strict
scrutiny to the gender classification because the Hawaii Constitution contains
an equal rights amendment. 97
1. Gender or Race?
Baehr is a gender case, however, Justice Levinson relied heavily on Loving
v. Virginia,98 a case in which the Supreme Court invalidated miscegenation
laws. 99 Levinson merely substituted racial language in Loving with gender
language and then followed Chief Justice Warren's reasoning, 1°° which
dismissed the lower (Naim) court's conclusion that a miscegenous marriage is
intrinsically unnatural.101 According to Levinson, "constitutional law may
mandate, like it or not, that customs change with an evolving social order." 1°2
Scholars have developed arguments linking racism and African-American
minority identity with miscegenation statutes. After Baehr, parallels between
the development of gay identity and African-American identity are easier to
draw, but still difficult to defend. The differences between these two groups
have been used to justify rejection of gay rights'0 3 and to divide the broader
93 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1985).
94 7di Death Do Us Part, ADVOC., June 15, 1993, at 25.
95 "Recitation of gay law leads only to one conclusion: the Rivera Prindple-all the
opposition need do is come to court, shout queer, and all bets are off-irrationality reigns,
precedents do not hold, and equal treatment disappears from the Constitution."
Rivera, supra note 56, at 558.
96 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
9 7 HAW. CONST., art. 1, § 21.
98 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 9 Id. at 12.
100 Baehr y. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Raw. 1993).
101 I.
102 ld.
10 3 This is, in part, a result of the Court's focus on immutable characteristics. As this
Note suggests, the immutability of sexual orientation may become jurisprudentially
irrelevant in light of Baehr's adoption of socially constructionist notions of homosexuals,
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civil rights movement. 104 Professor Richards argues that focus on difference is
misplaced:
Racial prejudice is an invidious political evil precisely because it is
directed against central aspects of a person's cultural and moral identity on
irrationalist's grounds of subjugation in virtue of that identity. The central
point is not that its irrationalist object is some brute fact that cannot be
changed, but that it is based on a central feature of moral personality: in
particular, "the way people think, feel, and believe, not how they look"-the
identifications that make them "members of the black ethmic community." 105
Richards suggests that minorities are defined by self-identification and
separate treatment by society and the judicial system. Our Constitution's
fundamental protection, Richards argues, is freedom of conscience. 1°6 Such a
reading of this jurisprudence softens the lines between different minority
groups and supports the Baehr plurality's facile substitution of gender for race
in the Loving language.
2. But, Are They Even Gay?
Baehr is also notable for what it does not say. Baehr sidesteps the sexual
orientation issue, suggesting that the marriage law might prevent same-sex
heterosexual couples from marrying. 107 By taking this approach, the Baehr
plurality accepts earlier precedent limiting privacy and marital-rights based
gender, and marriage. If not, recent scientific studies suggest that sexual orientation is
genetically determined (possibly immutable). See, e.g., SIMON LEVAY, THE SEXUAL BRAIN
120 (1993) (finding a correlation between the size of the hypothalamus and male sexual
orientation); Mom's Fault?, ADVOC., Aug. 24, 1993, at 30 (discussing an NIH study linking
homosexuality to chromosomal structure).
104 For example, a gay rights opponent argued that African-Americans were "lynched,
beaten by police, not allowed to vote, not allowed to eat in restuarants, not allowed to drink
at public fountains, not allowed to hold jobs .... " Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights
Debate in the States: Decodng the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
283, 292 (1993), (citing Are Gay Rights a Civil Right? David Canton Says No, and He
Wants Florida Voters to Close the Debate Forever, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 18, 1993, at
8); see a/so Gay Rights/Special Rights (a video published by the Traditional Values
Coalition).
105 Richards, supra note 45, at 503-04 (quoting F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO is BLAcK?:
ON NATION'S DEFmrrmN (1991)).
106 Id. at 505.
107 "[Plarties to 'a union between a man and a woman' may or may not be
homosexuals. Parties to a same-sex marriage could theoretically be homosexuals or
heterosexuals." Baehr, 852 P.2d at 51 n.ll.
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arguments108 and transcends them. Under Baehr it is neither necessary to find
that marriage is fundamental nor that the privacy line of cases °9 could
encompass the decision to marry someone of the same sex. Instead, Baehr
assimilates feminist theories of homophobia and separates marriage from
sexuality and propogation with which it has been laden since Augustine. If
Judeo-Christian definitions of marriage, which limit it to a man and a woman,
are sexist, then it is irrelevant whether the plaintiffs are gay or straight. 110
Only two justices supported the plurality's analysis: A third wrote a
concurring opinion that goes in a very different direction. The concurrence
accepts the plurality opinion on the condition that a lower court finds that
homosexuals are a suspect class.11 It is not clear why, if the issue is gender, it
is necessary to find an additional suspect class. 112 Because the trial judge
108 The plurality considers the earlier gay marriage cases and rejects them. See supra
note 89. It also, however, refuses to make marriage a fundamental right.
[We are being asked to recognize a new fundamental right. There is no doubt that
"[a]s the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and
enforce the Hawaii Constitution, we are free to give broader privacy protection [under
article I, section 6 of the Hawaii Constitution,] than that given by the federal
constitution." However, we have also held that the privacy right... is similar to the
federal right. . . . The inquiry is whether a right involved is of such a character that it
cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions .... [We do not believe that
a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of
our people ....
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 57 (citations omitted).
109 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110 See supra note 103.
111 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 70 (Burns, J., concurring).
The dissent notes earlier same-sex marriages cases in which a fundamental right to
marriage was rejected. The dissent also rejects the sex-based classification argument. Id., at
71 (Heen, J., dissenting).
The plurality responds: "The rationale underlying Judge Heen's belief, however, was
expressly considered and rejected in Loing .... Substitution of 'sex' for 'race' in section 5
for the fourteenth amendment yields the precise case before us together with the conclusion
we have reached." Id. at 67-68.
112 As used in the Hawaii Constitution, to what extent does the word "sex" refer? In
my view, the Hawaii Constitution's reference to "sex" includes all aspects of each
person's "sex" that are "biologically fated." The decision whether a person when born
will be a male or a female is "biologically fated." Thus, the word "sex" includes the
male-female difference. Is there any other aspect of a person's "sex" that is
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hearing the case on remand has decided to hear arguments relating to
compelling state interest and has not sought testimony regarding the
"suspectness" of the sex-based class, 113 it is very likely that Hawaii will
become the first state to recognize same-sex marriages.
IV. THE TERMS THEY ARE A CHANGIN'
"Why did you call him Tortoise, if he wasn't one?" Alice asked.
"We call him tortoise because he taught us," said the Moc* Twile
angrily: "really, you are vey dull! "114
Some may say, it is all sound and fury, that whether courts define a group
by what it does, who it desires, or subsumes it within other groups, the group
goes on doing whatever it does, being whatever it is. In fact, however, groups
in Western culture have developed within and in response to justice as it has
affected them. This has been particularly true in the United States, where
tensions have flared when the courts have outpaced or lagged behind
society." 5 These battles over language are real battles, affecting individual
lives. Groups fight to be able to label themselves, 16 because language is
"biologically fated"?
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 69 (Burns, L, concurring). "If heterosexuality, homosexuality,
bisexuality, and asexuality are 'biologically fated,' then the word 'sex' also includes those
differences." ld.
Essentialist and constructionalist theories of same-sex sexual identitity are beyond the
scope of this Note. See supra note 6. It should be noted, however, that never before has
there been as much scientific support for a finding of immutability necessary for suspect
class classification. See supra note 103. Further, Professor Coles has argued that attorneys
can side step the issue of immutability. Coles, supra note 80.
113 Interview with Daniel Foley, lead attorney for the plaintiffs in Baehr (Tan. 14,
1995).114 CARROLL, supra note 1, at 142.
115 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
116 Professor Rivera writes:
Language often defines the battles and, in some cases, wins them. In the case of
gay men and lesbians, the first fight was to control their own "name." The term
"homosexuals" was the label society preferred, a pseudo-medical term that labeled gay
men and lesbians as one-dimensional erotic beings who were best described with a
medical pathological term. Like "negroes" winning the right to be "blacks" or "African
Americans," the gay population has had to fight to control its own definition.
Rivera, supra note 56, at 561.
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power-particularly in law, where language is precedent, deciding both the
instant case and subsequent cases.
A. Developing Homophobia and Sexism
At the turn of the century, charges of homosexual conduct made against
Kaiser Wilhelm 's entourage and cabinet forced the court and society to
define the same-sex activity occurring and clarify their reaction to it.117 Jakob
Ernst, a farmer, who was embroiled in the case by virtue of his sexual
relationship with Philipp Prince zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, was characteristically
ignorant of definitions and moral perceptions of his sexual acts. He did not
even know what to call them.118 To him, there was nothing special-except
having a relationship with a member of the aristocracy-about what they had
done. This case served to introduce the term homosexuality, 119 and in so doing
helped define and organize a group self-identified by its recognition of its
interest in committing "homosexual" acts.120
Later, the "Lesbian Slasher" 121 and the Navy's Newport Training Station
inquisition122 raised similar socio-legal-definitional battles in American courts.
In fact, the Newport example suggests that as recently as the 1940s, American
society's objection to same-sex sexuality was ambivalent, or-at least-more
closely related to traditional objections to blurring the gender lines and
"feminizing" men. The Navy found nothing wrong with enlisting its sailors to
search out "fairies" and have sex with them in order to create evidence of the
"fairies'" misconduct. As long as a man abstained from engaging in the
feminine sexual role, it seems, there wasn't anything terribly offensive about
same-sex sexual conduct. "Navy officials never considered prosecuting the
many sailors.., who were being serviced by the fairies each year," Professor
117 Stealdey, supra note 63, at 233.
118 Ernst testified: "IfI have to say it: What people say is true. What it's called I don't
know. He taught it to me. Having fun. Fooling around. I don't know of no real name for it.
When we went rowing we just did it in the boat." Id. at 253 (citing Maximilan Harden,
Fa4rst Eulenburg, in 3 PRozpssE 173,258 (1913).
119 A homosexual is "an effeminate man, a person who confounded sex-role
stereotypes by virtue of his emotionality, passivity, artistic temperament, emotional
attachment to men .... "Id. at 251.
120 R
121 Lisa Duggan, The Trials of Alice Mitchell: Sensationalism, Sexology, and the
Lesbian Subject in Turn-of-the-Century America, 1993 SIGNs 791, 794 (a murder trial in
which a woman stabbed the female object of her unrequited love).
122 George Chauncey, Jr., (Jzristian Brotherhood or Sexual Perversion? Homosexual
Identities and the Construction of Sexual Boundaries in the World War I Era, in Duberman,
supra note 6, at 294.
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Chauncey writes, "because they did not believe that the sailors' willingness to
allow such acts 'to be performed upon them' in any way implicated their sexual
character as homosexual."123
B. Baehr's Relativism v. Augustine's Absolutism and Posner's
Pragmatism
Under Bowers, gay rights threatened to become-perversely-separate
from sex, the original "orienting" commonality. Now, after Baehr, gay rights
could be subsumed within the movement for equal rights for women. Gay
activists may not be ready to give up their separateness so quickly after
winning recognition of it, 124 nor may all feminists be willing to include among
their ranks homosexuals or accept so easily the notion that gay men are bound
by the same social ties as women. The crucial distinction brushed aside by the
Baehr court is the basic physiologic difference between women and men-
whether gay or straight. 125 Some scholars argue that the broader opportunities
present for women in non-Western societies was most directly a result of
communal child rearing. 126 In fact, some feminist scholars locate the root of
sexism in the fundamental relationship of men and women to the child-rearing
experience. 127 This paradigm finds support in our courts' examination of
marriage before Baehr, in which the male-female dynamic was found to be the
123 Id. at 305. Similarly, Boswell finds the first prohibitions against same-sex unions
suggest an emphasis on gender roles and not sex-acts. "When a man marries a [man] as if
he were a woman, what can he be seeking, where gender has lost its place?" BOSWELL,
UNzONS, supra note 31, at 85 (quoting CODE TH. 9.7.3).
124 [While some would try to constitute "identity" as the ground for claiming larger
social inclusion (e.g., we are the same as everybody else and hence should not be
treated differently), others would use "difference" as a strategy to interrupt the
hegemony of dominant social/sexual arrangements (e.g., we are different and our
difference will resist those practices that try to make us the same).
Cohen, supra note 22, at 73.
125 Professor Dorothy Dinnerstein argues that these physiologic differences are the
roots of gender inequality. DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR:
SEXUAL ARRANGMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE 10-26 (1963); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real
Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for
Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MAmML. REV. 511, 614 (1992).
12 6 See id. C. H LNE CIXOUS & CATHERINE CLEMENT, THE NEWLY BORN WOMAN
(Betsy Wimg trans., 1986) (noting that women are defined by motherhood).
127 See generally KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE AeoTr
WORK, CAREER, AND MOTHERHOOD 29-37 (1985); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A Dul.ERENT
VoicE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 46-47 (1982).
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defining feature of an institution created to propagate our species. 128 Of course,
with contemporary developments in technology and a trend towards
dismantling the nuclear family, these notions have less meaning. Similarly,
Freudian analysis of sexuality is rooted in women's solitary child-rearing
responsibility. 129 Both the legal and psychological conclusions serve to further
sexist roles, which the push for recognition of same-sex relationships can
marginalize by destablizing our notions of family.
But can freeing propagation from marriage separate women from their
fundamental role any more than freeing sodomy from sexual orientation freed
gays from discrimination? Most courts have failed to recognize that Bowers
affirmed only the criminalization of sodomy and did not establish that
homosexuals are criminals per se because of their propensity to engage in it.
The truth remains that Augustine's writings on sex130 repeatedly work their
way into academic and applied explorations. Justice Burger's concurrence in
Bowers is always there, as a haunting recognition of the centrality of Judeo-
Christian absolutes in equal and fundamental rights analysis.131
As Eskridge notes, a new, more serious notion has crept into our legal
paradigms. 132 Pragmatism has become the ultimate value-roused everywhere.
The Honorable Richard Posner, probably America's most preeminent living
legal scholar, delved into gay civil rights issues in his work Sex and Reason.'133
He attempted to apply law and economic principles to the gay rights agenda.' 34
128 "The institution of marriage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a finly, is as old as the book of Genesis." Baker
v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
129 See, e.g., Nancy Chodorow, Mothering Male Dominance and Capitalism, in
CAPrrALIsT PATRIARCHY AND THE CAsE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 83, 84-86 (Zilla H.
Eisenstein ed., 1979).
130 See Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy:
Abandoning Scriptual, Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35
How. LJ. 173, 181-83 (1992).
131 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). "Condemnation of those
[homosexual] is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id.
132 See William N. Eskridge, A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and
Reason. Steps Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE LJ. 333 (1992) (book review)
(arguing that Posner's work displays a tension between libertarian principles and pragmatic
impulses); Jason S. Johnston, Not So Cold An Eye: Richard Posner's Pragmatism, 44 VAND.
L. REv. 741 (1991).
133 RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 291 (1992).
134 Eskridge, supra note 132, at 341.
i]n place of moral arguments, Posner advocates utilitarian cost-benefit analysis as the
lodestar for justifying any regulation of sexuality. That is, regulations of sexual behavior
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Although this process could expose weaknesses in simpler Judeo-Christian
analyses of these issues, it stops short, arguing against the product of its own
analysis. According to Posner, same-sex marriage is so far beyond our
society's values that whatever economic rationality it possesses is overcome by
the social costs of making such a change: Economic efficiency is limited by
pragmatism. 135 Posner's analysis removes the courts from their historic role as
developers of social norms. Would Brown v. Board of Education136 have been
rational under Posner's model? Even less socially provoking cases might also
have failed. Consider Miranda v. Arizona.137 Nevertheless, Posner's
examination indicates two important developments: First, a mainstream (most
would even say conservative) legal scholar is tackling the problems of gaylegal
jurisprudence. Second, Posner displays an inherent acceptance of relative
definitions of socially defining terms. By examining the economic rationality of
restrictions against gays in society, he rejects the absolutism of Augustine138
and Justice Burger.' 39 Nevertheless, Posner's pragmatism stops short,
reincorporating moral values and sacrificing libertarian principles when they
lead to unpopular results (but what is unpopular now may not be unpopular
tomorrow).40
must be justified by a fact-based demonstration that the behavior has generated
"externalities" (costs of individual behavior imposed upon third parties without their
consent) and that the regulation will reduce the externalities without itself imposing
excessive costs.
I. at 342.
135 Id at 347.
136 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (requiring desegregation of public schools).
137 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring the government to warn defendants who are in
custody of their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
138 At the heart of Patristic writing was an aversion to sex. Patristic writers in general
believed that the best way of life was that of a perfect continence. Indeed, they loathed
sex and saw it as something that could interfere with the religious way of life. Thus, the
Church Fathers viewed marriage suspiciously as a type of "indulgence" for those not
morally strong enough to abstain. These Patristic writers believed that "it was never
good for people to have sexual relations; in marriage the evil might be mitigated, even
forgiven-but only under certain circumstances."
Friedman, supra note 130, at 181 (quoting James A. Brundage, Allas! That Evere Love Was
Synne: Sev and Medieval Canon Law, CATH. HIST. RLv. 4 (1986). Aquinas believed that
any non-procreative sexual act was an unnatural vice. Id. at 185.
139 Rivera has argued that this is part of a broader homophobia in our courts "the
Rivera principle." See supra notes 56, 75.
140 Eskridge, supra note 132, at 351.
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The Baehr plurality may not be as disingenuous, then, as it first seems.
Not only is there a basis for finding gender discrimination and sex-role
stereotypes in the plain language of the marital statute, but there are also no
reasons-outside of our Augustinian focus on propagation-to assume that a
marriage is an inherently sexual relationship. Why couldn't, as the Baehr
opinion suggests, there be a marriage of two same-sex heterosexual people-
committed to the health and well-being of each other?141 Historically, marriage
has more often been an economic and contractual relationship than a romantic
and sexual one.
Baehr is certainly, as Posner might say, unsensible; however, as Posner's
work suggests, when the terminology is recognized as inchoate, the law
changes as society changes. Apparently, for at least two justices, marriage is an
inherently inchoate term and its present incarnation is inefficient and
unnecessary.
V. TOTO, I DON'T THINK WE'RE IN HAWAII ANYMORE
If civil rights litigation moves from the federal courts to the state courts,
full faith and credit will be a fulcrum whenever a transportable right or status is
implicated. For example, when, where, and under what circumstances will a
Hawaii same-sex marriage be recognized? Family law presents unique choice
of law issues. 142 Although the validity of divorce decrees continues to be
questioned, 143 there is a trend to recognize both prior divorce decrees and
marriage if valid where celebrated. 144
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adopts this position, but also
allows a public policy exception. Section 283 states:
(1) The validity of marriage will be determined by the local law of the
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in
section 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the
141 Professor Boswell writes: "In very few human societies do similar assumptions
[that romantic love and marriage are inextricable] prevail." BOSWELL, UNIoNs, supra note
31, at xx. Marriage has more commonly been an economic relationship. Also note that
Boswell suggests that marriage itself is an undefined and changeable term. Id. at xxi.
142 E.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT'L &
CoNP. L.Q. 952,953 (1977).
143 Caust-Ellenbogen, supra note 26, at 641.
144 J. Philip Johnson, Note, The Validity of a Marriage Under the Conflict of Laws, 38
N.D. L. REv. 442,456 (1962).
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marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it
violates the stronger public policy of another state which had the most
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
marriage. 14 5
Recognizing the section 283(2) exception, some states have already passed
legislation explicitly saying that Baehr is obnoxious to its public policy.146 A
similar result will probably hold in those states that still criminalize sodomy. 147
Professor Barbara Cox develops a framework in which to analyze these
conflict of law problems. 148 Cox begins her analysis by dividing the states by
the type of statutes that they have in place. Twenty-two states have adopted
variations of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act: 149
All marriages contracted within this state prior to January 1, 1974, or outside
this state that were valid at the time of the contract or subsequently validated by
the laws of the place in which they were contracted or by the domicile of the
parties are valid in this state. 150
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act comments state: "[This section]
expressly fails to incorporate the strong public policy of the Restatement
145 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFICr OFLAws § 283 (1969).
146 Related measures have been proposed in Utah, (Dan Harrie, Bill Drafted to Bolster
Ban on Homosexual Mariages: Utah Gay, Lesbian Actiists Call Proposal Discnimination:
Homosexal Mariages Would Be Banned By Bill, SALT LAKE TRm., Feb., 9, 1995, at Bi),
Arizona, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Idaho, and Michigan. Bettina Boxall,
Anti-Gay Rights Measures Ignite Aggressive Battles in 7 States, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1994,
at AS. For an examination of the difficulties in preventing recognition of a same-sex
marriage, see Joseph W. Mcknight, Fanily Law: Husband and Wife, 48 SMU L. REV.
1225 (1995).
147 See supra note 81. Homer suggests that in states where a same-sex marriage is
recognized and sodomy is criminalized, Bowers might suggest a different standard for
married and unmarried same-sex couples-raising for the first time in gay culture the
concept of premarital sex. Steven K. Homer, Against Marriage, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 505, 513 (1994).
148 Barbara I. Cox, Swe-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: .f We Marry in Hawaii,
Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1033, 1041; see also
Deborah M. Henson, Wdl Sane-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full Faith
and Credit and Due Process Limiations on States' Choice of Law regarding the Status and
Incidents of Homosexual Maniages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE
J. FAM. L. 551 (1994); Thomas M. Keane, Note, Aloha, Marriage? Constitutional and
Ohoice of Law Argunents for Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 47 STAN. L. REV. 499
(1995).
149 Cox, supra note 148, at 1066.
150 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-112 (West 1991).
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(Second) and hence may change the law in some jurisdictions. This section will
preclude invalidation of many marriages which would have been invalidated in
the past." 151 In these states all marriages have been accepted-even where
contrary to statutory policy-unless expressly prohibited.152 (Only two states
explicitly prohibit same-sex marriages.) 153 Still, Cox suggests the remaining
states will probably turn to public policy in determining the validity of the
marriage. 154
Five states have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act of 1912,
which states:
If any person residing and intending to continue to reside in this state sho
is disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this state
shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage prohibited
and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall be null and void
for all purposes in this state. 155
These states will probably reject a Hawaii same-sex marriage. If, however,
these courts follow precedent requiring express statutory prohibitions in the
law, they may be forced to validate the marriage. 156
According to Cox, the remaining states follow either the First Restatement
or: "some alternative choice-of-law approach; chief among them Brainerd
Curie's 'governmental interest analysis,' the Second Restatement's 'most
significant relationship' test and Robert A. Leflar's 'Choice-influencing
considerations.'" 157
Under the First Restatement, states will either validate the marriage
because they are "understandably reluctant 'to negate a relationship upon which
so many personal and governmental relationships depend,'" 158 or find same-
sex marriage to be sufficiently like polygamous and incestuous marriage to be
excepted as morally offensive. States following Currie's "governmental interest
approach" will likely apply their own marriage law and deny recognition to the
same-sex couple. 159 The Second Restatement's approach leads states to public
151 UNr. MARIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 210, 9A U.L.A. 176 (1987).
152 Cox, supra note 148, at 1069.
153 Id at 1070.
154 Id
155 These states include Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
Henson, supra note 148, at 567 n.55.
156 Cox, supra note 148, at 1077.
157 Id. at 1083 (footnotes omitted).
158 Id at 1085.
159 Id. at 1092.
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policy considerations. 160 And finally, under Leflar, judges are given wide
discretion in choosing whether to apply the "better law." 161
Cox's article, however, merely introduces the subject, as it neglects the
distinction the Supreme Court has drawn between statutes and judgments, 162
precedent that leads to almost perpetual review of true conflict of law cases, 163
and the limitless complexity of alternate facts. Further, Cox's analysis
presumes two citizens of state X marry in Hawaii and return to X. What if the
putative spouses are from different states? What if they own property in a
different state? What if they later move to a new state? What if when passing
through a new state, they try to invoke some spousal right or one spouse dies?
Each time the variables change, the analysis shifts. The possible complexity is
seemingly endless, and may in itself be the best argument to convince courts to
recognize a Hawaii same-sex marriage.
Baehr's adoption of a social constructionist critique of marriage will spur a
wave of re-analysis and lawmaking. Since, marriage has been defined as a
status bringing with it a bundle of rights, 164 a court might recognize a Hawaii
160 Id. at 1096.
16 1 Id. at 1097.
16 2 See Brilmayer, supra note 26.
163 A "true conflict" arises when two or more states have equal-or legitimate-
interest in the controversy. For example, a same-sex couple from Ohio who marry in
Hawaii, might find an Ohio court unwilling to apply Hawaii law. As Ohio domicilaries,
Ohio law should control. See BRAInERD CURRiE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLIcr OF
LAWS (1963). But see Robert A. Leflar, True "False Conflicts," et Alia, 48 B.U. L. REv.
164, 169 (1968) (arguing that a "true conflict" arises whenever two state laws could be
applied).
Courts do not seem to follow either pattern consistently. See, e.g, Ram v. Ramharack,
571 N.Y.S.2d 190 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (recognizing a common law marriage, although
New York had outlawed such, because the marriage was consummated in Washington,
D.C.); Mogowan v. Mogowan, 226 N.E.2d 304 (N.Y. 1967) (husband could not attack
wife's divorce decree except in the state where the divorce took place); Sacks v. Sacks, 263
N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (not recognizing personal jurisdiction on second wife in
another state in action by first wife for annulment of the second marriage); Chusid v.
Chusid, 142 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (allowing second marriage to be rendered
valid by the retroactive divorce action of husband's first wife according to Nevada law); In
re Perart's Estate, N.Y.S.2d 879 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950) (consequences which would affect
validity of Virginia divorce decree will not affect parties residing in New York); Verbeck v.
Verbeck, 65 N.Y.S.2d 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) ("a foreign divorce decree may not be
attacked collaterally where the issue of residence was contested in the foreign
jurisdiction.-).
164 These rights include:
(1) a variety of state income tax advantages, including deductions, credits, rates,
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same-sex marriage, but follow its own statutes-as they are quite free to do-in
allocating those rights that flow from the marriage on some basis that excludes
same-sex couples. Same-sex couples may find themselves married, but with a
marriage without the accompanying rights. Like the soldier serving under
"don't ask, don't tell," who can be gay but can neither discuss it publicly nor
act on her gayness, the same-sex couple may be married, but may not receive
spousal employment benefits, such as tax-benefits, right to intestate succession,
and the like. 165 Judicial language might not only become relative and fluid, it
exemptions, and estimates; (2) public assistance from and exemptions relating to the
Department of Human Services; (3) control, division, acquisition, and disposition of
community property; (4) rights relating to dower, curtesy, and inheritance; (5) rights to
notice, protection, benefits, and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code; (6) award
of child custody and support payments in divorce proceedings; (7) the right to spousal
support; (8) the right to enter into premarital agreements; (9) the right to change of
name; (10) the right to file a nonsupport action; (11) post-divorce rights relating to
support and property division; (12) the benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential
marital communications; (13) the benefit of the exemption of real property from
attachment or execution; and (14) the right to bring a wrongful death action.
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw.), reconsideration granted in part, 975 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993) (citations omitted). See also Kevin A. Zambrowicz, Comment, "To Love and
Honor All The Days of Your Life".• A Constitutional Right to Sarne-Sex Maniage?, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 907, 908 n.5 (1994). But is not marriage more than the sum of its parts?
If marriage becomes something less than status there will be no predictability in the law. As
the problem presented in this section suggests, marriage as a bundle of rights would lead to
a litigious state. Cox, supra note 148, at 1092.
165 According to the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, the following rights and benefits are contingent on marital status
in Hawaii:
Veteran's preference to spouse in public employment; vacation allowance on
termination of public employment by death; funeral leave for government employees; travel
and transportation expenses of government employees; accidental death benefits for
surviving spouse for government employees; assistance to disabled persons; lease of
agricultural parks; continuation of rights under existing homestead leases, certificates of
occupation, right to purchase leases and cash free hold agreements concerning the
management and disposition of public land; inheritance of land patent; lower hunting license
fee; eligibility for housing opportunity allowance program of the Housing Finance and
Development Corporation; tax relief for natural disaster losses; income tax deductions,
credits, rates, exemptions, and estimates; homes of totally disabled veterans exempt from
property taxes; exemption from conveyance from tax; airport relocation assistance for
disabled persons; non-resident tuition deferential waiver; making, revoking, and objecting to
anatomical gifts; rights and proceedings for involuntary hospitalization and treatment; legal
status and the rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of a child; waiver of fees for
certified copies and searches of vital statistics; disclosure of vital statistics record;
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may become irrelevant. This, however, is overly simplistic. Some state will
likely accept Baehr without such subterfuge, and in the states that do not, the
legislatures and courts will have to walk a careful path in order to separate all
the fruit from the tree without creating new legal challenges.
Congress, too, will have to respond to Baehr. Federal legislation generally
applies benefits based on marital status however a state creates it. In the past
these differences have been narrowly drawn over such issues as common-law
marriage, marrying next-of-kin, and marrying under the age of majority. Some
in Congress would surely fight extending federal entitlements to same-sex
couples. The same-sex couple will probably find themselves in a maze in which
neither status nor language is unchanged. Whether they find the equality for
which they fought, or merely find language that is what it is not, is unclear.
VI. CONCLUSION: DOES IT MEAN ANYTHING?
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
permission to make arrangements for burial or cremation; public assistance from the
Department of Human Services; exemption from real property lien of Department of
Human Services of allowance to surviving spouse; exemption from real property lien of
Department of Human Services of allowance to surviving spouse; exemption from claims of
Department of Human Services for social service payments, financial assistance, or burial
payments; notice of guardian ad litem proceeding; criminal injuries compensation; burial of
servicemen's dependents; payment of worker's compensation benefits after death; payment
of wages to relative of deceased employee; beneficial owner status of corporate securities;
proof of business partnership; insurance licenses, coverage, eligibility, and benefits;
organization of mutual benefits society; in vitro fertilization procedure coverage; consent to
a postmortem examination; right to a gasoline dealer franchise; control, division,
acquisition, and disposition of community property; exemption from regulations of
condominium sales to owner-occupants; sole interest on property; qualification as facility
for the elderly; notice to probate proceeding, rights by way of dower or courtesy, right to
inherit property; appointment as guardian of minor; right of survivorship to custodial trust;
rights to notice, protection, benefits and inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code;
award of child custody in divorce proceedings; support payments in divorce action; right to
support from spouse; right to enter into premarital agreement; right to change name; right
to file action for nonsupport; right to support after divorce; division of property after
dissolution of marriage; spousal privilege and confidential marital communications; real
property exempt from attachment or execution; right to sue for tort and death by wrongful
act; right to be notified of parole or escape of inmate; bill of rights for victims and
witnesses; and succession to Hawaii Homes Commission leases. Plaintiffs' Brief at 20-23,
Baehr (No. 91-1394-05) (citations omitted).
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"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat. 166
The only thing certain after Baehr, is that although it takes us far, it leaves
far to go. Every state supreme court will hear arguments on the full spectrum
of gay-legal issues. Judges will decide whether their distaste for same-sex
marriage is overcome by America's larger interest in comity. This process
offers opportunities to challenge society's assumptions. Women-and, in fact,
all minorities could gain by the discourse.
The Baehr plurality has brought social constructionist analysis into
American jurisprudence. Like Posner's libertarian "law and economics," social
constructionism recognizes that society changes over time and differs from
culture to culture and that law should adapt to these changes. By bringing
sexual orientation into the fold of sex, Baehr directly attacks the Supreme
Court's recent retreat to Judeo-Christian norms (or "Natural Law") evidenced
in Bowers.
There is a risk, however, that this taste of change in our laws and social
constructs could be too much for society to handle. The Supreme Court, in
fact, might embrace the limit on Posner's libertarianism and pragmatism, and
decide the time is not ripe for Baehr's challenge. In so doing, the Court would
sacrifice comity and growth in our law and culture in favor of stability.
16 6 CARROLL, supra note 1, at 89.
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